While much of the US-driven academic debate has focused on if and how cyber operations reach the threshold of war, this paper focuses on the organizing of offensive capabilities between military and intelligence in Europe. Drawing out key organizational differences and ambiguities, the analysis identified three models of organizing military and intelligence relations: A Dutch collaboration model, a French separation model, and a Norwegian centralization model. << 2 A Chinese-led hacking spree exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsofts Exchange Server to gain access to more than 30.000 victims in the US alone (Conger and Frenkel Citation2021). /Author (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,U.S. This includes political and legal questions of when exactly an offensive cyber operation can be regarded as a use of force. Finland sees many opportunities of enhanced cooperation for example in conducting training and exercises in the cyber domain, said Mr. Jukka Juusti, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of Finland. It has been more than a decade since France made cyberwar a national security priority and mandated the development of defensive and offensive cyber capabilities (Commission du Livre blanc sur la dfense et la scurit nationale Citation2008). hbbd```b``" , :Q`Z0{"m"S&IL0;DAd%t'^+hFg` %Y First, cyber operations are often custom-made combinations of intelligence, intrusion, and attack (Smeets Citation2018). PDF Inmarsat Maritime - Cyber security requirements for IMO 2021 It is not publicly disclosed how the human and technical infrastructure resources are pooled in the event of a cyber-attack on the Netherlands surmounting to armed conflict. Cyberwarfare: Artificial Intelligence in The Frontlines of Combat 11 0 obj Despite their divergence in organizing cyber capabilities, the three countries converge on the assumption that both responding to cyber conflict short of war and developing military cyber power are dependent on the skills, information, and infrastructure of intelligence services. But why this Norwegian particularity? The MIVD and JSCU are therefore crucial partners for the DCC. ]}"F1;p]"D37a{ hbbd``b`$ +qUAD=""gVH0* /C [0.718 0.329 0.0] We formally analyse security gains and return on investment ratio of DHR in single-node model and defense-chain model scenarios, respectively, and show the relationships between the main parameters of DHR . The Norwegian organization of cyber capabilities is founded on a centralized model that dissolves the organizational distinction between military and intelligence entities. The doctrine calls for increased coordination and collaboration between the Cyber Command and the intelligence services. NATO Resources - Cyber Defence - NATO Library at NATO Library 7 0 obj The Education for Seapower (E4S) study was a clean-sheet review of naval learning and focused on flagship institutions like the U.S. The aim of this strategy is to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. This report summarizes the discussions and findings of the Workshop on Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defence and Resilience organized by the NATO research group IST-152-RTG. /Creator (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command,U.S. (PDF) Israeli defense in the age of cyber war - ResearchGate /Producer (Mac OS X 10.10.5 Quartz PDFContext) The deployment of cyber capabilities has a long history with the French foreign intelligence service The General Directorate for External Security (DGSE) (Gudard Citation2020). The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities raises several questions for policy makers, practitioners, and scholars to consider. A cyber command function outside the Intelligence Service will, for Norway, be an unfortunate and costly solution. The capability and competence in offensive cyber operations is to be further developed (Forsvarsdepartementet Citation2020, 118). /Pages 2 0 R Photo: Defense Dept. /Length 260 The ANSSI is organizationally separated from the intelligence and military branch of French cybersecurity. According to Stphane Taillat (Citation2019), a significant part of offensive cyber operations is the responsibility of the DGSE and lies outside of the French military cyber strategy. Why does Norway not have a standalone cyber command? << This creates risks that operational capability and activity may be mismatched with broader strategic or governance goals, that the military and intelligence entities operate with different purposes and goals, that political decision-making is hampered, and that democratic oversight is hindered. Paragraph 20 - Cyber Threats. Architecting Cyber Defense: A Survey of the Leading Cyber Reference stream Third, zooming in on the relationship between the COMCYBER and the intelligence services, it has been stressed that the intelligence services provide essential support to military operations by offering both technical and operational elements necessary to acquire knowledge of the adversary and operational environment (Florant Citation2021, 19). NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The Department of Defense's enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Toward Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defense: Report of the 8 Fleet Secure Endpoint - installation and use 30 - Dashboard and alerting 30 - Fleet Secure Endpoint use in context 31 9 Cyber security, Crew Training and Awareness 32 10 Fleet Secure Endpoint - real case studies 34 11 Conclusion and Next Steps 36 White Paper Cyber security requirements for IMO 2021 CYBER SECURITY When is maneuvering in cyberspace for intelligence purposes vis-a-vis military cyberspace operations mutually exclusive, reinforcing, and supporting? NATO and Finland step up cyber defence cooperation /XObject << Navy Emphasizing Maritime Cybersecurity Investments Despite the military operations need for technical and operational support from intelligence services, it is unclear what if any role the intelligence services play in this area. PDF Cyberspace in Multi-Domain Battle - United States Army Norway has kept with this model in order to foster synergies and reduce the costs of developing and deploying cyber capabilities. >> This report is the Department of the Navy (DON) 30-year shipbuilding plan for the FY2022 Presidents Budget (PB2022). First, the ANSSI can respond to a computer attack affecting the national security of France by carrying out the technical operations necessary to characterize the attack and neutralize its effects by accessing the information systems that are at the origin of the attack (Gry Citation2020). According to interviewees, the DCC lacks the necessary human expertise and technical infrastructure to carry out offensive cyber activities on its own. 5 0 obj /ModDate (D:20161020020335-07'00') The rapid development of cyber threats and intelligence challenges the traditional design of static cyber defense platforms. The observed divergence in organizing cyber capabilities is likely to be explained by multiple factors, including strategic posture, military culture, economic and human resources, and political will and attention. The analysis of the Dutch organization of cyber capabilities shows organizational separation between the DCC which can deploy cyber capabilities in the event of armed conflict and war and the intelligence services that can deploy cyber capabilities for intelligence and active defense purposes. Yet, as emphasized by the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute (NUPI), given the high degree of secrecy around these issues, we do not know the division of labor between PST [Police Security Service], NSM [National Security Authority] and the Intelligence Service here, but it can be demanding to maintain concrete and formal distinctions between acquisition, impact operations, and security measures in the digital space. Policy Brief ; 39. 10 Except for the French Ministry of Defense. This document contains the official biographies of the leadership for USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort as of 2020. Brussels Summit Declaration. The Convention is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the Internet and other computer networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security. /Length 186 In 2017 it became the cyber defense command (COMCYBER) and was placed directly under the chief of staff of the armed force. 11 The French defence procurement and technology agency (DGA) is responsible for project management, development, and purchase of weapon systems for the French military. Consequently, the paper neither provides an exhaustive conceptualization of the organization of cyber capabilities, nor a set of fully fledged policy prescriptions of the requirements for intelligence services or military cyber commands to conduct specific cyber operations. This paper discusses the need for an agile structure to inform the development of cybersecurity solutions that are not only widely adaptable to unknown threats, specific business practices, and technical requirements, but are also efficiently translatable to products. The Ministry states that the ability to carry out offensive cyber operations depends on a very good understanding of the target. 18 . /Filter /FlateDecode Note: According to Section 1.4 Transition Plan of the new instruction, the old DoDI 5000.02 dated Jan 7, 2015 (Change 3 dated 10 Aug 2017) has been renumbered to DoDI 5000.02T. The COMCYBER rely on the Information Management Division of the Directorate General of ArmamentFootnote11 (DGA-MI) for the development and design of cyber capabilities (Ministre des Armeses Citation2019b, 11). . While the principle of separation is strong on paper, the French organization of cyber capabilities is more complex. The United States Navy, as the maritime component of the Department of Defense, has global leadership responsibilities to provide ready forces for current operations and contingency response that include the Arctic Ocean. Fri: 10:00 - 15:30, Author(s): Marrone, Alessandro; Sabatino, Ester, Author(s): Pawlak, Patryk; Tikk, Eneken ; Kerttunen, Mika, Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, November 2019, Estonian Information System Authority, 2019, NATO Research Task Group (RTG) IST-152 Intelligent Autonomous Agents for Cyber Defense and Resilience (March 2018), U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM, March 2018, Secrtariat gnral de la dfense et de la scurit nationale, 12 fvrier 2018. Decision makers should thus give thought to how the organizing impacts the broader strategic, tactical, and operational prioritization between intelligence and military objectives. As our future enlisted leaders proceed from the stern to the bow over the course of their careers, making each milestone, they are building the backbone of our future Navy that is enduring and deeply connected to the heritage of those that have gone before us. This article advances this debate by undertaking a comparative analysis of how the Netherlands, France, and Norway organize their cyber capabilities at the intersection of intelligence services and military entities. . NATO and its Allies rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliances core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. This has arguably led to overly militarized approaches to cyber security (Burton and Christou Citation2021, 1732). Cybersecurity scholarship has also investigated the organization of both military cyber entities (Pernik Citation2020, Smeets Citation2019) and offensive cyber capabilities (Smeets 2018). The vision is anchored on a three-pronged approach of readiness, capability and capacity, and spans all aviation-related platforms and weapons. /ProcSet [/PDF /Text /ImageB /ImageC /ImageI] Our Navy cannot build the framework for leadership development without first "Laying the Keel." The collaboration between the DCC and MIVD/JSCU raises strategic and legal issues as the MIVD and JSCU operate under different political and legal mandates. << << The Concept of Cyber Defence Exercises (CDX): Planning, Execution It then examines the organization of cyber capabilities across military and intelligence entities in the Netherlands, France, and Norway. As part of this clarification, the strategic review formalizes four operational cyber chains and consolidates their governance. it is, according to the Ministry of Defense, neither necessary nor desirable to create a cyber command outside the Intelligence Service. For the JSCU it is shared with the corresponding official of the Ministry of Justice and Security. On January 27, 2017, President Donald Trump directed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to initiate a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The plan highlights the Navys work in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to build a modernized naval force that makes needed contributions to advance the Joint Forces ability to campaign effectively, deter aggression, and, if required, win decisively in combat. Sec. BAE Systems is developing cyber defense capabilities to help aircraft detect and mitigate cyber attacks in real time. endobj Second, the SGDSN has declared that ANSSI will continue to develop operational synergies with its national institutional partners. endstream endobj startxref 8 The highest-ranking civil servant in the Dutch Ministry of Defence. The primary tasks of the unit are the collection of signal intelligence and the delivery of intelligence through cyber operations. objective to transition to commander-driven operational risk assessments for cybersecurity readiness. (Posted Oct. 27, 2021 by Naval Aviation Enterprise Public Affairs). NATO and North Macedonia strengthen responses to cyber threats(19 February 2021). << They suggest that strategy must be unshackled from the presumption that it deals only with the realm of coercion, militarised crisis, and war in cyberspace (Harknett and Smeets Citation2022, 2). TENTH Fleet,CHIPS Magazine) This article has demonstrated significant divergence in organizing cyber capabilities across military and intelligence in the Netherlands, France, and Norway. >> 2 0 obj TENTH Fleet,CHIPS Magazine) The White House Blog - Melissa Hathaway (29 May 2009), White House 60-Day Cyberspace Policy Review (2009), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (February 2003). Organizing cyber capability between military and intelligence, The Netherlands: organizational collaboration, Conclusion: future paths for policy and research, https://english.defensie.nl/topics/cyber-security/cyber-command, https://www.ihemi.fr/articles/organisation-france-europe-cybersecurite-cyberdefense-V2. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape. The attack made Colonial Pipeline a company. >> stream The specifics of leader development will be shaped by community leaders to be consistent with this Framework, but the fundamental concepts discussed in this Framework apply to the entire Navy Team. As Arctic ice recedes and maritime activity increases, the Coast Guard must be prepared to administer and inform national objectives over the long-term. This paper presents a brief survey of artificial intelligence applications in cyber defense (CD), and analyzes the prospects of enhancing the cyber defense capabilities by means of increasing the .
fleet design for cyber defense 11 aug 2017